漏洞挖掘(1)

声明:谢绝一切形式的转载。

在计算机的世界中,有输入的地方就有江湖,因为有输入的地方,就有可能有漏洞。比如xss,目前很多大型网站依然存在xss漏洞。

一个简单的程序

下面的程序是求一个数的平方。

#include<stdio.h>
int main(){
        int a =0;
        scanf("%d",&a);
        printf("%d\n",a*a);
        return 0;
}

编译 gcc test.c
运行 ./a.out
在这里插入图片描述通过观察,很容易看出当输入一些"畸形"数据的时候会导致程序运行出现错误。如果只有二进制文件,有什么办法可以检测出这种错误?

Fuzz

A software testing technique, often automated or semi-automated, that involves passing invalid, unexpected or random input to a program and monitor result for crashes, failed assertions, races, leaks, etc.

术语

● Target

  • Consumes an array of bytes
  • Calls the code we want to test

● Fuzzer

  • A tool that feed the target with different random inputs

● Corpus

  • A set of valid & invalid inputs for the target
  • Collected manually, by fuzzing, or by crawling

fuzz的种类

  • Generation Based :通过对目标协议或文件格式建模的方法,从零开始产生测试用例,没有先前的状态
  • Mutation Based :基于一些规则,从已有的数据样本或存在的状态变异
  • Evolutionary :包含了上述两种,同时会根据代码覆盖率的回馈进行变异。

传统fuzz

传统的 fuzz 大多通过对已有的样本 按照预先设置好的规则 进行变异产生测试用例,然后喂给 目标程序同时监控目标程序的运行状态。这类 fuzz 有很多,比如: peach , FileFuzz 等。

实战

相关文件位于:https://github.com/Dor1s/libfuzzer-workshop/tree/master/lessons/02

生成测试用例

radamsa 是一个 测试用例生成引擎,它是通过对已有的样本进行变异来生成新的测试用例。下面的代码主要通过调用 radamsa ,然后随机选取 seed_corpus 目录中的文件名作为参数,传递给 radamsa 进行变异,把生成的测试用例,放到 work/corpus。

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# generate_testcases.py
import os
import random

WORK_DIR = 'work'

# Create work `directory` and `corpus` subdirectory.
if not os.path.exists(WORK_DIR):
  os.mkdir(WORK_DIR)

corpus_dir = os.path.join(WORK_DIR, 'corpus')
if not os.path.exists(corpus_dir):
  os.mkdir(corpus_dir)

seed_corpus_filenames = os.listdir('seed_corpus')

for i in xrange(1000):
  random_seed_filename = random.choice(seed_corpus_filenames)
  random_seed_filename = os.path.join('seed_corpus', random_seed_filename)
  output_filename = os.path.join(WORK_DIR, 'corpus', 'testcase-%06d' % i)
  cmd = 'bin/radamsa "%s" > "%s"' % (random_seed_filename, output_filename)
  os.popen(cmd)
开始fuzz

fuzz程序如下,target是vscode,Corpus是上面程序生成的测试用例。

#!/usr/bin/env python2
# run_fuzzing.py
import os
import subprocess

WORK_DIR = 'work'

def checkOutput(s):
  if 'Segmentation fault' in s or 'error' in s.lower():
    return False
  else:
    return True

corpus_dir = os.path.join(WORK_DIR, 'corpus')
corpus_filenames = os.listdir(corpus_dir)

for f in corpus_filenames:
  testcase_path = os.path.join(corpus_dir, f)
  cmd = ['/usr/bin/code', testcase_path]
  process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
  output = process.communicate()[0]
  if not checkOutput(output):
    print testcase_path
    print output
    print '-' * 80

由于用于变异样本的选取 和 样本的变异方式是随机的,可能需要重复多次 样本生成 && fuzz 才能找到 crash。写个 bash 脚本,不断重复即可

#!/bin/bash
while [ "0" -lt "1" ]
do
  rm -rf ./work/
  ./generate_testcases.py
  ./run_fuzzing.py
done

libFuzzer

feature

  • In-process, in-memory
  • Guided fuzz testing
  • Very effective at a function / protocol level
  • 1000x faster
  • It’s easy to write a libFuzzer-based fuzzer
  • Can be checked along with unit-tests

Memory Tools

● AddressSanitizer (aka ASan)

  • Detects use-after-free, buffer overflows (heap, stack, globals),
    stack-use-after-return, container-overflow
  • Cpu: 2x, memory 1.5x-3x

● MemorySanitizer (aka MSan)

  • Detects uninitialized memory reads
  • Cpu: 3x, memory: 2x
  • Special mode: origins

● UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer (aka UBSan)

  • Detects several classes of bugs (19?), esp on type confusion,
    signed-integer-overflow, undefined shift, etc.
  • Cpu: 10-50%
  • Memory: ~1x (no allocator, no shadow)

Helloworld-For-libFuzzer

本节资源位于:https://github.com/Dor1s/libfuzzer-workshop/tree/master/lessons/04。

target
bool VulnerableFunction1(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
  bool result = false;
  if (size >= 3) {
    result = data[0] == 'F' &&
             data[1] == 'U' &&
             data[2] == 'Z' &&
             data[3] == 'Z';
  }

  return result;
}

在上面的程序中,当size=3的时候,访问data[3]会产生越界。

fuzzer

first_fuzzer.cc

extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) {
  VulnerableFunction1(data, size);
  return 0;
}

编译:clang++ -g -fsanitize=address,fuzzer first_fuzzer.cc
运行fuzzer: ./a.out 2>&1 | grep ERROR
在这里插入图片描述完整的输出

INFO: Seed: 100908111
INFO: Loaded 1 modules   (35 inline 8-bit counters): 35 [0x7f8120, 0x7f8143), 
INFO: Loaded 1 PC tables (35 PCs): 35 [0x5b7f68,0x5b8198), 
INFO: -max_len is not provided; libFuzzer will not generate inputs larger than 4096 bytes
INFO: A corpus is not provided, starting from an empty corpus
#2	INITED cov: 3 ft: 3 corp: 1/1b exec/s: 0 rss: 27Mb
#15	NEW    cov: 4 ft: 4 corp: 2/4b lim: 4 exec/s: 0 rss: 27Mb L: 3/3 MS: 3 CopyPart-CrossOver-InsertByte-
#1156	NEW    cov: 5 ft: 5 corp: 3/7b lim: 14 exec/s: 0 rss: 27Mb L: 3/3 MS: 1 CMP- DE: "F\x00"-
#2688	NEW    cov: 6 ft: 6 corp: 4/15b lim: 29 exec/s: 0 rss: 27Mb L: 8/8 MS: 2 ChangeByte-InsertRepeatedBytes-
#2704	REDUCE cov: 6 ft: 6 corp: 4/13b lim: 29 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 6/6 MS: 1 EraseBytes-
#2844	REDUCE cov: 6 ft: 6 corp: 4/12b lim: 29 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 5/5 MS: 5 CrossOver-PersAutoDict-CrossOver-EraseBytes-EraseBytes- DE: "F\x00"-
#3080	REDUCE cov: 6 ft: 6 corp: 4/11b lim: 29 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 4/4 MS: 1 EraseBytes-
#3172	REDUCE cov: 6 ft: 6 corp: 4/10b lim: 29 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 3/3 MS: 2 CopyPart-EraseBytes-
#10828	REDUCE cov: 7 ft: 7 corp: 5/70b lim: 104 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 60/60 MS: 1 InsertRepeatedBytes-
#10840	REDUCE cov: 7 ft: 7 corp: 5/29b lim: 104 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 19/19 MS: 2 PersAutoDict-CrossOver- DE: "F\x00"-
#10933	REDUCE cov: 7 ft: 7 corp: 5/24b lim: 104 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 14/14 MS: 3 ChangeByte-InsertByte-EraseBytes-
#11125	REDUCE cov: 7 ft: 7 corp: 5/21b lim: 104 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 11/11 MS: 2 InsertByte-EraseBytes-
#11361	REDUCE cov: 7 ft: 7 corp: 5/18b lim: 104 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 8/8 MS: 1 EraseBytes-
#11482	REDUCE cov: 7 ft: 7 corp: 5/14b lim: 104 exec/s: 0 rss: 28Mb L: 4/4 MS: 1 EraseBytes-
=================================================================
==3357==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000040f73 at pc 0x00000059b461 bp 0x7fff657ee560 sp 0x7fff657ee558
READ of size 1 at 0x602000040f73 thread T0
    #0 0x59b460 in VulnerableFunction1(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/lessons/04/./vulnerable_functions.h:22:14
    #1 0x59bde4 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/lessons/04/first_fuzzer.cc:10:3
    #2 0x466186 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:556
    #3 0x46b7e9 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470
    #4 0x46b7e9 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:699
    #5 0x46e80f in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::Fuzzer::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:830
    #6 0x456b99 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:824
    #7 0x41f522 in main /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19
    #8 0x7fa043c3eb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-2ORdQG/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
    #9 0x41f599 in _start (/home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/lessons/04/a.out+0x41f599)

0x602000040f73 is located 0 bytes to the right of 3-byte region [0x602000040f70,0x602000040f73)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x597b58 in operator new[](unsigned long) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_new_delete.cpp:102
    #1 0x466092 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:541
    #2 0x46b7e9 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470
    #3 0x46b7e9 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:699
    #4 0x46e80f in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::Fuzzer::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:830
    #5 0x456b99 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:824
    #6 0x41f522 in main /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19
    #7 0x7fa043c3eb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-2ORdQG/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/burning/linux/libfuzzer-workshop-master/lessons/04/./vulnerable_functions.h:22:14 in VulnerableFunction1(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0c0480000190: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
  0x0c04800001a0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
  0x0c04800001b0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
  0x0c04800001c0: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
  0x0c04800001d0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
=>0x0c04800001e0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa[03]fa
  0x0c04800001f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c0480000200: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c0480000210: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c0480000220: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c0480000230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
  Shadow gap:              cc
==3357==ABORTING
MS: 5 CopyPart-EraseBytes-PersAutoDict-EraseBytes-ChangeBinInt- DE: "F\x00"-; base unit: 9dbab5c181e3d878fa7e1229929a99dc1f04abf4
0x46,0x55,0x5a,
FUZ
artifact_prefix='./'; Test unit written to ./crash-0eb8e4ed029b774d80f2b66408203801cb982a60

正常的话应该可以看到类似上面的输出,这里对其中的一些信息解析一下

  • Seed: 1608565063 说明这次的种子数据
  • max_len 用于设置最大的数据长度
  • 接下来 # 开头的行是 fuzz 过程中找到的路径信息
  • 最后一行是触发漏洞的测试用例

重现crash:

ASAN_OPTIONS=symbolize=1 ./a.out ./crash-0eb8e4ed029b774d80f2b66408203801cb982a60
# ASAN_OPTIONS=symbolize=1 用于显示 栈的符号信息

写在最后

文章中涉及到很多英文内容,个人不能翻译到信、达、雅的地步,所以就保留原文了。

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在这里插入图片描述

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